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Every profession must have some outlet for fun and games. For 
economists, it has become forecasting the economic growth rate and the pace of 
inflation for the next quarter. Because of the magnitude of resources 
devoted to that task -- and the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
results I feel compelled to present a warning about pinpoint accuracy. 
Some years ago, one of my neighbors in St. Louis remarked that the 
Mississippi River was exactly 1,000,008 years old. How could he be so sure? 
It turned out that just eight years previously, he had heard the state 
geologist set Old Muddy's age at 1 million years. 
Candidly, we must acknowledge that our ability to make quarterly 
forecasts of the American economy is on a par with my neighbor's capability to 
pinpoint the age of the Mississippi. Modern computers can generate numbers 
far more rapidly than our capacity to use them for making economic 
predictions. Time and again in recent years, projections of economic growth 
and inflation for the next three months have been off both in terms of 
direction of change as well as magnitude -- and so substantially as to be 
Note: The author is indebted to Richard Cook for helpful research assistance 
in the preparation of this paper. 
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worse than useless. These short-term estimates are often both misleading to 
the users and destructive to the general reputation of economists. 
Yet I do not counsel my fellow economists to rend their garments, don 
sackcloth and ashes, and recite from the Book of Lamentations. There is a lot 
that we do know about how an economy operates. 
For one thing, there is near universal agreement in the economics 
profession on microeconomic matters that is not appreciated by the public. 
For example, clamp a ceiling on rents (albeit from the most altruistic motive) 
and you will produce a shortage of housing. Indeed, as a general proposition, 
artificially depress the price of any good or service, and you will soon find 
that more people will want to buy and consume the item than are willing to 
produce and sell it at that price. That elementary bit of economic 
understanding continues to have powerful applications in policy making. 
At the macroeconomic level, the results of any one policy action-- such 
as cutting income tax rates or slowing down the growth of the money 
supply -- are harder to gauge. The basic reason is that so many other factors 
are at work at the same time. Unlike experimenters in the physical sciences, 
economists (and other social scientists) cannot hold 11 everything else 11 
constant. 
Thus, increasing the money supply is likely to lead to a higher level of 
nominal Gross National Product. But other factors simultaneously could cause 
a slowdown in the velocity of money that would negatively influence the level 
of GNP. Those two results more money available to the public but a 
slowdown in the desire to use it-- would tend to offset each other. 
Forecasting the performance of the economy requires taking into account a 
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great number of monetary, fiscal, industrial, international, and other 
influences. 
Over a period of a year, however, many of these specific influences tend 
to offset each other. That is why humorists in the profession contend that 
St. Offset is the patron saint of economic forecasting. Indeed, the record of 
professional forecasters is much better at projecting a calendar year ahead 
than the next three months. Looking back over the last few years, I contend 
that annual forecasts of GNP have, on balance, served a useful purpose for 
business and government decision makers. 
In late 1982, for example, most professional forecasters projected a 
substantial increase in the economy• s growth rate -- typically from a decline 
of 2 percent in 1982 to a positive expansion in the neighborhood of 3 percent 
in 1983. Successive revisions in the data complicate any comparison of 
forecasts and actuals. Historical economic statistics are revised so 
frequently that one wag lamented, 11The past is as uncertain as the future. 11 
Nevertheless, the actual growth in 1983 of 3.7 percent was not fundamentally 
off the mark. Thus, economic forecasters in late 1982 were essentially right 
in projecting that 1983 would be a period of reasonable growth compared with 
the negative trend of 1982. Those who relied on that economic assumption were 
not mislead. 
Likewise, the popular projection in the fall of 1983 was reasonably 
helpful. Forecasters generally anticipated a substantial acceleration in the 
growth rate to 5 percent or more in 1984. The expansion for the year almost 
reached 7 percent. The most recent experience was quite similar. Last fall, 
virtually every forecaster predicted a major slowdown in econohlic growth this 
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year, at one-half or less of last year's rate-- and we surely delivered. The 
actual figure, it now appears, will be in the neighborhood of 2 1/2 percent. 
Like my neighbor in St. Louis, if you anticipate pinpoint accuracy, you 
will be disappointed. But prevailing economic forecasts have been helpful in 
indicating general directions and trends for the year ahead. 
A ~1ore Formal Analysis 
Let us more formally examine the track record of economic forecasters in 
the United States for recent years. First, let us examine the relative 
accuracy of the prevailing private-sector forecast. As we will see, the 
impressionistic survey that I have just presented holds up tolerably well. 
Then we will compare that performance with the federal government's official 
projections. 
Table 1 shows, for each of the last eight years, the composite projection 
of real growth by the 50 leading professional economic forecasters who 
comprise the Blue Chip Economic Indicators. The forecast made in the month of 
October of the prior year was selected because it is typical of the starting 
point for company planning and budgeting for the year ahead. For the eight 
years for which data are available, the average absolute error came to 1.2 
percent. The poorest performance came in 1982, when the forecasting 
fraternity missed the direction of change and the resultant forecast error was 
by far the most substantial of the period. 
Now let us compare, for the same period, the official economic 
projections by the administration then in office (see Table 2). We must 
acknowledge the fact that they are published several months later, typically 
in late January and occasionally in early February. But, given the fact that 
these numbers are heavily relied on in preparing the revenue and expenditure 
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Table 1 
COMPARISON OF BLUE CHIP PROJECTIONS AND 
ACTUAL CHANGE IN REAL GNP 
Percent Change in Rea 1 GNP 
Calendar Blue Chip Forecast 
Year Forecast Actual Error 
1977 4.9% 5.5% -0.6% 
1978 4.3 5.0 -0.7 
1979 2.7 2.8 -0.1 
1980 -0.2 -0.3 +0.1 
1981 0.9 2.5 -1.6 
1982 2.2 -2.1 +4 .3 
1983 3.2 3.7 -0.5 
1984 5.1 6.8 -1.7 
Average Absolute Error •.•..••.•..•.•.•••••.••••...•...••.•.••..•..••.. 1.2% 
Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators and U.S. Department of Commerce 
Calendar 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
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Table 2 
COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION 1 S PROJECTIONS AND 
ACTUAL CHANGE IN REAL GNP 
Percent Change in Real GNP 
Administration 
Forecast Actua 1 
5. 2% 5.5% 
4.7 5.0 
3.3 2.8 
-0.6 -0.3 
0.9 2.5 
0.2 -2.1 
1.4 3.7 
3.3 6.8 
Forecast 
Error 
-0.3% 
-0.3 
+0.5 
-0.3 
-1.6 
+2.3 
-2.3 
-3.5 
Average Absolute Error ••••••••••.•.••..••.•..•.•••....••••..•...•.•••. 1.4% 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and various annual federal budgets. 
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estimates in the federal budget, the economic assumptions are usually agreed 
on well before their publication. In any event, the average error during the 
past eight years came to 1.4 percent, a little higher than the Blue Chip 
experience. The error in 1982 was substantial, but not nearly as large as the 
Blue Chip record. The large discrepancies in 1983 and 1984, in contrast, were 
much greater than the Blue Chip projections. I refrain from any editorial 
comment as to whose scenario was so rosy. 
How about inflation? The common conclusion is that economists have done 
even more poorly on this score than in projecting real growth. Let us see. 
Table 3 compares the Blue Chip projections of the GNP deflator with the actual 
results for the last eight years and also with the official projections. A 
few surprises are in store for us. First of all, the average private 
forecaster did about as well on inflation as on economic growth {1.1 percent 
average discrepancy compared with 1.2 percent for the change in real GNP). 
Second, and perhaps more surprising, the record of an administration in 
office in Washington tends to be a tad better than the prevailing private 
inflation forecast (off by 0.9 percent, on average, compared with 1.1 
percent). Of course, no statistical significance can be attributed to that 
difference and that is what I find to be so significant. 
Conclusion 
Neither public nor private projections of annual U.S. economic 
performance qualify for the Guiness Book of World Records. Nevertheless, over 
the years and on average, the projections turn out to be close enough to 
reality to serve as a useful guide to government and business planners and 
decision makers. As for quarterly projections, I believe that we should 
seriously consider abandoning the practice until the state-of-the-art improves 
s u b s tan t i a 1 1 y • 
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Table 3 
COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATION 1 S AND BLUE CHIP PROJECTIONS 
ACTUAL CHANGE IN THE GNP DEFLATOR 
Calendar Blue Chi~ Administration 
Year Actua 1 Forecast Error Forecast Error 
1977 5.8% 5.6% -0.2% 5.6% -0.2% 
1978 7.4 6.0 -1.4 6.1 -1.3 
1979 8.6 7.3 -1.3 7.7 +0.9 
1980 9.2 8.5 -0.7 8.9 -0.3 
1981 9.6 9.1 -0.5 10.5 +0.9 
1982 6.0 7.8 +1.8 7.9 +1.9 
1983 3.8 5.7 +1.9 5.2 +1.4 
1984 3.8 5.0 +1.2 4.2 +0.4 
Average Absolute Error 1.1% 0.9% 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and various annual federal budgets. 
